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Abstract 
China’s economy has developed rapidly since the introduction of market reforms in 1978. In 
parallel came the reforms within the financial sector and the most of financial 
intermediation between savings and investment has been channelled through the banking 
sector. Thus far studies on the finance-growth nexus in China have focused on the financial 
sector as a whole. This thesis aims to determine the impact of different banking institutions 
on economic growth and assess the compatibility of state financial policies with country’s 
economic performance. The empirical analysis is performed using annual data for the period 
1978 to 2005. Using the Granger-causality test procedure under vector autoregressive model 
I examine the relationship between economic growth and, respectively, different types of 
banks and different types of loans. The procedure provides evidence that presence and 
direction of causality is affected by the type of bank as well as type of loan. There is two-way 
causality between economic growth and policy banks as well as rural credit cooperatives. 
The development of state-owned commercial banks and other commercial banks merely 
follows economic growth. Furthermore, loans to construction sector Granger cause growth 
and there is a one-way causality between growth and loans to commercial sector. The fact 
that policy banks manage to positively influence China’s development might indicate that 
state policies concerning financial sector and economic growth are successful. However to 
sustain the growth it is important to further develop  financial services, ensure better credit 
allocation and improve access to financing for private as well as small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
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1.  Introduction 
China has developed rapidly since the introduction of the open-door policy in 1978 
and its market structure is different now than it was at the beginning of the transformation. 
First decades of the reforms were characterized by the dominant position of the state-
owned enterprises, nowadays it is the private sector that takes the lead. In the banking 
sector the monobank system was replaced by commercial banking, stock markets emerged 
and new regulatory bodies were established. Still the most of financial intermediation 
between savings and investment is channelled through the banking sector. However, the 
access to financial institutions is still restricted, with private enterprises having difficulties in 
receiving credit from banks or acquiring funds from capital market. 
There is a long debated issue weather there is a connection between financial 
development and economic growth. The question is whether there is a causality and if so in 
what direction: is it the financial development that induces economic growth or maybe 
financial development merely follows economic growth. Many studies have proven active 
role of the financial sector. If that is the case, China can be an especially interesting aspect of 
this discussion, because it has managed to develop very fast although the country is 
considered to have weak financial institutions. 
1.1. Aims and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the issue of finance-growth nexus in China and 
to determine the contribution of different banking institutions to growth by applying 
Granger causality test procedure. There is a possibility that it is not the whole financial 
sector but some more efficient parts of it that induce growth. Previous studies focused on 
aggregated values and did not reflect on contribution of particular banks and loans. 
Furthermore I would like to take into consideration the strong state involvement in the 
banking sector and try to assess how it might affect growth. 
Therefore this thesis is intended to answer the following questions: 
• Do different types of banking institutions affect growth differently? 
• Can the purpose of a loan be a significant determinant of whether it contributes to 
growth?  
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• Are state policies concerning financial sector compatible with economic growth? 
1.2. Method and material 
In order to determine the connection between financial sector development and 
economic growth an analytical framework that draws on the finance-growth nexus literature 
will be developed. The works by Levine, Khan, Boyreau-Debray and Maswana among many 
others help to determine analytical framework and choose appropriate variables for the 
model. In the thesis Granger Causality Test under vector autoregression model was applied 
to examine the effects of banking sector development on growth. The ratio of total credit 
was first broken down to amounts of loans granted by different types of banks and secondly 
to different types of loans. The model also included control variables for the GDP growth: 
FDI flows as proxy of physical capital and population with above - secondary schooling as 
human capital. The data series were taken from China Financial Statistics (2007) and China 
Statistical Yearbooks. 
1.3. Limitations 
Possible limitation of the analysis is that credit ratios used in the study do not capture 
financial development that takes place outside the banking system such as the stock or bond 
markets. However, in China it might be of lesser significance since financial development 
comes about mostly within the banking sector and other channels are still not very 
developed.  
Another, more general shortcoming, common for all studies of finance-growth nexus, 
is the fact that according to the theory financial institutions induce economic growth by 
reducing information and transaction costs, monitoring borrowers, managing risk or 
facilitating exchange of goods. Researchers, however, do not posses very good measures to 
assess how well a financial system provides these kind of services to the economy. Thus the 
empirical proxies of financial development do not correspond that closely to the theory 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, 2008). 
1.4. Disposition 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of 
theories and literature concerning financial development and economic growth nexus. 
Section 3 presents Chinese banking sector and state financial policies. Section 4 turns to 
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description of the data and variables. Section 5 describes the procedure of examining the 
connection between economic growth and different types of banks and loans. Section 6 
presents the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
2. Financial development and economic growth: theory and literature review 
The connection between financial development and economic growth is a long 
debated issue. Back in 1911 Joseph Schumpeter argued that financial development induces 
economic growth. His main point was that through the services that financial intermediaries 
bring about, like mobilizing saving, managing risk, facilitating transactions or evaluating 
projects, technological and economic development is stimulated. Technological change is 
the key in Schumpeter’s reasoning. His idea of “creative destruction” is a process of constant 
replacement of old production methods and goods with better procedures, commodities, 
and services by invention and innovation. And financial intermediaries enable this 
technological innovation (King, Levine, 1993).  
Hicks (1969) also noticed that financial institutions might facilitate growth. Though he 
focused on capital formation. From this perspective capital formation can be influenced by 
financial institutions through altering the savings rate or by reallocating savings among 
different capital producing technologies. Liquidity is crucial here. The high-return projects 
involve a long-run commitment of capital and savers are generally reluctant to lose control 
of their savings for a long time. The task of financial institutions is to enhance the liquidity of 
long-term investments so that more investment is expected in the high-return projects. 
According to Hicks the industrial revolution in England was mainly caused by the capital 
market improvements that moderated liquidity risk (Levine, 1997). 
The above general view was shared by scholars like Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973), who opted for the proactive function of financial services as well. 
Goldsmith (1969) assumed that the size of a financial system is linked with the supply and 
quality of financial intermediation and his analysis on 35 sample countries proved a positive 
correlation between the financial development and economic growth. MacKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) suggested that state involvement in the development of financial systems 
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can be an obstacle for economic growth. Thus financial development was perceived to 
positively affect growth. 
However, there were researchers who opposed this view or even neglected finance 
when analyzing economic development. The omission is especially notable in the works of 
‘pioneers of development economics’, among which were works by three Noble prize 
winners (i.e. Bauer, Colin Clark, Hirschman, Lewis, Myrdal, Prebisch, Rosenstein-Rodan. 
Rostow, Singer, and Tinbergen). Neither of them included finance as a factor in development 
(Levine, 1996). Joan Robinson (1952) said that “where enterprise leads finance follows.” It is 
suggested by this that financial development merely follows the growth in an automatic 
response to emerging demand for different financial arrangements. Lucas (1988) and 
Chandavarkar (1992) also expressed their doubts. The former claimed that economists 
“badly over-stress” the importance of financial factor in economic growth. The latter pointed 
out how finance had been ignored in the studies on development and drew attention to the 
analysis by Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), which concluded that “financial factors are 
important only when financial instability becomes a dominant force in the economy”. 
The development of endogenous growth models gave a bigger scope for financial 
intermediation in influencing economic performance (Liu, Shu, 2002). Within these models 
Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986, 1990) enhanced the definition of investment to contain 
human capital and allow for externalities in investment. Given that they suggested that 
returns to investment are slightly diminishing or even non-diminishing. Following this idea, it 
is financial institutions, when properly fulfilling their tasks, that can generate externalities in 
investment and by this secure non-diminishing returns to investment in the endogenous 
growth models. 
Nowadays the question is not if financial development is an important factor for 
growth but rather what the causality is. When we look at economic and financial 
development - which is the cause and which is the effect? Determining the roles of financial 
system can help us identify possible channels of influence. 
There are seven main functions of financial system (Khan, 2000). Firstly, it mobilizes 
savings by pooling households’ savings and making them available for lending. This way 
transaction costs related to external finance for both households and companies are 
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reduced. Firms save money by not having to contact many potential lenders and simply 
going to one financial institution. Likewise, savers do not need to evaluate every borrower 
and just place money with financial institution.  
Allocation of savings is the second function. It is the financial system that decides 
who obtains loans. Due to the fact that financial institutions are specialists, they can 
determine the best investments, properly asses risks and make the decision about 
worthwhile borrowers cheaper than a typical small investor.  
The third aspect is that by spreading investors’ funds among many diverse 
investment opportunities financial system reduces the overall risk. This risk diversification 
reduces the uncertainty of households connected with individual projects, which in turn 
promotes savings.  
The fourth role is linked with generating liquidity. Difficulties arise for investors when 
they unexpectedly need to withdraw their money, thus they are not that willing to commit 
themselves for long-term investments. Financial institutions however invest funds both in 
long and short term projects. This mix of long and short term investments not only brings 
higher profits but also investors can access their money if they unexpectedly need it. And 
what is more, at the same time it is ensured that worthwhile long term investments are 
funded, which gives us the fifth role.  
The sixth one is to facilitate trade by extending credit and guaranteeing payments. 
There are various financial instruments like currency and demand deposits or credit cards 
that smooth the process of exchanging goods so individuals do not need to use barter. 
Furthermore, instruments like letters of credit help enterprises in managing their liquidity 
and order articles necessary for production in spite of delays in payments for their sales.  
Exerting corporate control and monitoring managers is another role of financial 
system. In order to offset the information advantage of entrepreneurs and managers who 
manage their projects and know more about their process and outcomes than outsiders like 
creditors and shareholders, which may lead to different malfunctions and in consequence 
discourage investment and savings, banks monitor borrowers, and equity markets make it 
possible for shareholders to control managers by voting out poorly performing executives. 
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Additionally, Levine (2004) points out another way of influence on economic 
performance – informational effect. Financial institutions ensure that ex-ante information 
about possible investment and capital is made available, which maybe does not eliminate, 
but at least reduces the effects of asymmetric information. 
The above roles indicate that properly functioning financial system is able to ensure 
more investments and savings, which through either capital accumulation (Hicks’ type of 
channel; Hicks, 1969) or technological change (Schumpeter’s type of channel; Schumpeter, 
1911) leads to increase in output and, as a result, economic growth. 
Since there can be significant correlation between financial development and 
economic growth, there comes the question of the role of state. The most popular view 
draws on the work of MacKinnon (1973), who described the case of financial repression 
where ceilings on interest rates harmed domestic savings, capital formation and economic 
growth. According to this view financial liberalization, thanks to which interest rates go up 
towards market-clearing levels making bank deposits more attractive, will lift the demand 
for money and bring about a higher level of investment and economic growth. On the other 
hand, Maswana (2008) compares financial system to ecosystem and draws conclusion that 
for some developing countries like China the most relevant function of financial systems is 
‘adaptive efficiency’ instead of allocative one. This means that even with financial repression 
financial system can be coherent with country’s developmental goals. And since financial 
system is integral to monetary and financial policies, it can support achieving better 
economic outcomes. 
As for the empirical studies, King and Levine’s (1993) research based on data from 
about 80 countries seems to support the view of active and positive role of financial 
institutions in encouraging economic growth. Also some other empirical studies such as one 
by Habibullah and Eng (2006) point toward positive correlation between financial 
development and growth. Furthermore there are studies providing evidence that the 
connection is not that straightforward. Shan, Morris and Sun (2001) as well as Demetriades 
and Hussein (1996) and Arestis and Demetriades (1997) all find positive causality, two-way 
causality and negative causality depending on the country examined. These results question 
12 
 
the accuracy of cross-country studies. They would imply that we have to be careful when 
generalizing the results, because each country can be a separate case.  
Thus far there has been several studies conducted regarding the Chinese case. Aziz 
and Duenwald (2002) concentrate their analysis on provinces and discover that on this level 
financial development measured by the amount of bank credits was actually negatively 
correlated with growth in a given region, which would indicate inefficient allocation of loans. 
Also Hao (2006) uses provincial data, but his results indicate a positive relation nonetheless. 
It is explained by the fact that current allocation of loans is still better than state budgetary 
appropriation that took place before the reforms. On the macroeconomic level, studies using 
the VAR framework dominated. Basing on the data from 1983 to 1997 Liu and Shu (2002) 
find out that financial development and economic growth reinforced each other. Liang and 
Teng (2006) however argue that over the period 1952–2001 there is unidirectional causality 
from economic growth to financial development. 
 In general, empirical studies provide conflicting result on the direction of causality 
both among various countries and in the case of China. None of them studies the effects of 
development of particular elements of financial system. This thesis aims to fill the gap by 
applying Granger causality test within VAR framework and examining the role of different 
banking institutions and different types of loans.  
3. Overview of financial sector and economic growth in China 
Most researchers would agree that financial sector reforms and development have 
been an important factor, on which sustained economic growth that has been observed 
throughout the last two decades in China depended. And the growth has been truly 
remarkable: since 1979 until 2005 the average annual growth rate stood at 9,6% (China 
Statistical Yearbook 2006). At the beginning, in 1980s, the growth was led mainly by 
increasing domestic consumption – it accounted for 70% of total GDP. Then in 1990s 
investment took over the chief position and consumption started losing ground. On the one 
hand there was increase in foreign investment, on the other – domestic capital investments 
had risen (Zhang, 2008). Private consumption fell from 49% of GDP in 1990 to 35% in 2008. 
Investment, on the contrary, grew from 35% to 44% of GDP (The Economist, 2009). To 
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measure the influence of financial system is far more difficult. First, we will look at the 
structure of financial sector in general. 
Since the introduction of opening-up policy and reforms in 1978 Chinese financial 
sector has experienced significant changes: the monobank system was replaced by 
commercial banking, stock markets emerged and new regulatory bodies were established.  
Until today the most of financial intermediation between saving and investment is 
channelled through the banking sector. The role of stock and bond markets is still rather 
limited. 
 Stock markets were introduced in China in 1990. One in Shanghai, old financial centre 
of China. Shenzhen was a fast growing city in the southern part of the country and, for the 
balance, the government decided to establish a stock market there as well. Two thirds of 
trading takes place in Shanghai, the rest Shenzhen. Important aspect of the market is that 
although the indexes might reach heights and transaction flourish, the fact is that most of 
the shares are non-tradable. In 2007 tradable shares constituted 29% of the total and 
although the ratio increases, still most of the shares remain untraded (China Financial 
Stability Report 2008). The combined capitalisation of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges at the end of 2007 stood as 133% of GDP. However the tradable market 
capitalisation was only 37% of GDP as shown in Fig. 1. Another problem is that stocks are not 
correctly priced. First they were underpriced but since 2007 a new feature emerged – 
overpricing. Stocks are more of a political issue in China and they play a minor role in 
financing business. In 2004 capital raised from the stock market made up 2.16% of all fixed 
asset investment. Also contribution of IPOs to national capital formation is very limited. On 
the other hand loans provided 80% of financing in 2007 compared to 13.1% of equity. 
Additionally, the importance of the banking sector is enhanced by the fact, that foreign 
companies are allowed only to get bank loans, they cannot loan from other companies. Thus 
it seems reasonable when analysing finance growth nexus to focus our attention on banks, 
which have the biggest share in financial sector. 
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Figure 1 Loans, stock and bond market size (Dec 2007) 
 
 Debt market in China, though developing, is still relatively narrow, segmented and 
lacking liquidity. The first unofficial bond markets began to develop in the 1980s. In the early 
1990s the government began to seriously supervise and  regularize the market and in 1997 
trading of government bonds was launched on the interbank market. The corporate bond 
market was reserved for several selected state owned enterprises and remained very small. 
Most of the bonds are issued by the government and policy banks. The amount of bonds 
traded and issued has grown fast, in particular since 1998, due to expansionary fiscal policies 
(Bottelier, 2004). At the end of 2007 the total issuance  accounted for 32% of GDP as seen in 
Fig. 1. 
To sum up the banking sector plays the biggest role in the Chinese financial sector 
and possibly has the strongest connection with economic growth. Thus this is the segment I 
want to focus on in the analysis from now on. 
3.1. Banking sector 
 China’s financial system is dominated by the banking institutions. As shown in Fig. 1 
total bank loans accounted for 105% of GDP in 2007. According to China Banking Regulatory 
Commission the total assets of the whole banking sector grew by 19.7% to 52,6 trillion RMB 
at the end of 2007. The banking sector can be divided into four main types of banks: state-
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owned banks, commercial banks, credit cooperatives and foreign banks. Additionally there 
are nonbank financial institutions. The structure is presented in detail in Fig. 2. 
 On the top of all institutions stands the People’s Bank of China, which since 1983 
serves as the central bank of China. It formulates and implements monetary policy and 
regulates financial markets. However, as opposed to the European Central Bank or the Bank 
of Japan, the Chinese central bank is not an independent body. The government has control 
over the expansion of new financial products and decisions concerning the level of the 
interest rates on loans. This way the authorities want to ensure that the policy of the central 
bank is compatible with other development policies and financial system stability (Maswana, 
2008). 
  In 2003 the China Banking Regulatory Commission was created to take over the 
responsibility for the banking sector regulation and supervision from the People’s Bank of 
China. The commission authorizes the establishment and termination of banking institutions 
as well as their business scope. Furthermore it formulates and enforces rules and regulations 
governing directly the banking sector. 
 When we look at the market share of different financial institutions by assets (Fig. 3), 
it turns out that the market shares are extremely uneven. State-owned commercial banks 
take up the biggest part of the market – good above 50% of all assets belongs to the big four. 
Their share has been decreasing continuously but slightly over the years of reforms and 
restructuring in the sector. Other commercial banks occupy the next spot with the share of 
nearly 20% at the end of 2007. The group comprises of joint-stock commercial banks and city 
commercial banks. Their share as well as number of banks and branches has been steadily 
increasing. The third biggest group is credit cooperatives. Rural and urban credit 
cooperatives together take up around 10% of the market, though credit cooperatives in the 
country have the dominant position in this group. Policy banks occupy around 8% of the 
total market share. The rest of the market, less than 10%, is shared by many, small in 
comparison, other financial institutions. 
Among the petty ones of the last group are foreign banks and nonbank financial 
institutions. It does not mean they do not have any functions, however from the perspective 
of the whole sector their influence on the financial system is minor. As presented in Fig. 2, at  
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Figure 2 Structure of the Chinese banking sector (2007) 
 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission 2007 Annual Report  
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the end of 2007 in China there were 242 representatives offices set up by 193 banks from 47 
countries. Furthermore there were 24 wholly foreign-funded banks and 117 branches 
established by 71 foreign banks from 23 countries. The assets of foreign financial institutions 
accounted for only 2.4% of the market, but the figure has increased somewhat over the 
years. The role of foreign banks is constrained by China’s domestic law, though the WTO 
accession requirements can allow for gradual increase in access to China’s domestic market.   
Figure 3 Market share (by assets) of China’s banking institutions 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Policy banks State-owned commercial banks
Joint-stock commercial banks City commercial banks
Rural credit cooperatives Urban credit cooperatives
Foreign banks Nonbank financial institutions
Other
 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission 2007 Annual Report    
The original role of foreign banking institutions was to offer foreign currency 
intermediation and so help foreign investors and manufacturers in doing business in China. 
Thus, at the beginning RMB business was completely closed to foreign banks. Since 1996 
local currency business has been gradually opened for foreign institution. First they could 
only offer RMB services to foreign clients in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Since the WTO entry 
the rules are started to be relaxed (Hansakul, 2004). By the end of 2006 the geographical 
restrictions and rules determining customer type were to be lifted. However the Chinese 
government still has means to constrain foreign banks.  
Nonbank financial institutions is another minor group in the market share. They 
constitute to around 2% of the total assets (Fig. 3). There are five major types of nonbank 
financial institutions: trust companies, finance companies of enterprise groups, leasing 
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companies, auto financing companies and money brokerage firms (Fig. 2). These are usually 
small institutions operating rather locally. The government current concern is to improve 
corporate governance of trust companies and to transform them from “the previous 
financing platforms to financial institutions that are trusted by customers for wealth 
management" (CBRC 2007 Annual Report). 
Table 1 Pre-tax profits of banking institutions (2003-2006) 
Unit: 100 million RMB 
 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 
Financial institutions 322,8 100% 1035 100% 2532,6 100% 3379,2 100% 
Policy banks 104,5 32,37% 130,9 12,65% 274,1 10,82% 311 9,20% 
State-owned commercial 
banks 
-31,9 0,00% 459 44,35% 1560,7 61,62% 1974,9 58,44% 
Joint-stock commercial 
banks 
146,5 45,38% 175,9 17,00% 289 11,41% 434,2 12,85% 
City commercial banks 54,2 16,79% 87,4 8,44% 120,7 4,77% 180,9 5,35% 
Rural credit cooperatives -5,5 0,00% 96,6 9,33% 120,3 4,75% 186,2 5,51% 
Foreign banks 16,6 5,14% 23,5 2,27% 36,6 1,45% 57,7 1,71% 
Nonbank financial 
institutions 
37,4 11,59% 50,2 4,85% 62,6 2,47% 129,5 3,83% 
Source: Calculation based on China Banking Regulatory Commission 2006 Annual Report 
However, when we take profits before tax into consideration the view of the 
strongest players on the market changes significantly. The data are available only since 2003, 
but still we can draw some conclusions. As shown in Table 1 up until 2004 state-owned 
commercial banks had losses in spite of their dominant position by the sum of assets. Other 
commercial banks, on the contrary, accounted for over 60% of all profits in the banking 
sector in 2003. The data would imply that there are serious issues in the performance of 
some institutions and different types of banks differ in the way they are managed, which can 
result in their diverse influence on economic growth. 
Nonetheless ninety percent of the market in terms of assets (Fig. 3) belongs to four 
groups of institutions: policy banks, state-owned commercial banks, other commercial banks 
and rural credit cooperatives. These are the groups further study will be focused on. 
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3.1.1. Policy banks 
 The three policy banks: China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China 
and Agricultural Development Bank of China, were established as a result of reforms in the 
banking sector in 1994. The aim of the reform was to separate commercial banks from policy 
lending and let policy banks handle the state funds assigned to promote policy-oriented 
investment and long-term projects. The banks were supposed to grant loans wisely, but 
were not expected to bring profits (Joseph, 1997). All three banks are solely owned by the 
central government. Funding of policy banks is organised mainly through issuing bonds and 
they accept few deposits. Their combined assets grew rapidly and now they account for 
around 8% of the market.  The fact that now they continually keep their share indicates that 
state-directed lending is persistently present in the banking sector (Hansakul, 2004). 
China Development Bank is the only policy bank with ministry status and it reports 
directly to the State Council. In 1994 it mainly took over the policy lending role from China 
Construction Bank and to some degree from Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(Maswana, 2008). Its main function is to foster China’s economic development. The bank 
finances major projects and initiatives according to national development plan and industry 
policies. It focuses its attention on lending to construction and renovation projects in 
strategic economic sectors. This involves mostly medium and long-term loans. In the period 
from 1994 to 2005 nearly 90% of lending was allocated to power, road construction, railway, 
petro-chemical, coal mining, telecommunications, public facilities, and agriculture & related 
industries (CDB, 2009). For example China Development Bank committed funds to projects 
like Shnghai Pudog International Airport, the Neijiang-Kunming Railway, Beijing Subway and 
the Three Gorges Dam. 
The Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) reports directly to the State 
Council. In 1994 it largely took over the policy lending function from the Bank of China, 
mainly the role of trade financing (Maswana, 2008). China Eximbank is now the main 
channel for the government to finance exports and imports of mechanic and electronic 
products, complete set of equipment, high and new technology products as well as offshore 
construction contracts and overseas investment projects (CEIB, 2009). One of the projects is 
for example to support China’s ship building industry. China Eximbank is also the only bank 
20 
 
in China that is allowed to extend Chinese Government Concessional Loan, which is a 
medium or long term, low interest rate credit granted to developing countries. In 2003 this 
included projects in 43 countries like Sudan and Indonesia (China Eximbank Annual Report 
2003).    
Table 2 Non-performing loans, ROA and ROE indicators for policy banks (2002-2006) 
 China Development Bank Export-Import 
Bank of China 
Agricultural Development 
Bank of China 
 NPLs ROA ROE NPLs ROA ROE NPLs ROA ROE 
2002 1,78% 1,20% 17,40% 5,01% n/a n/a n/a 0,17% 6,97% 
2003 1,34% 1,10% 16,00% 3,70% 0,03% 0,70% 42,00% 0,56% 21,77% 
2004 1,21% 1,20% 17,70% n/a 0,02% 0,72% 17,50% 0,32% 12,20% 
2005 0,87% 1,30% 19,20% 4,91% 0,05% 1,26% 10,29% 0,66% 26,90% 
2006 0,72% 1,19% 17,48% 3,47% 0,03% 1,58% 7,65% 0,98% 43,82% 
Sources: China Eximbank Annual Reports; Agricultural Development Bank of China Annual Reports, China Development 
Bank; Gale, Collender, 2006; calculation of ROA and ROE based on KPMG 2008 
In 1994 Agricultural Development Bank of China took over the function of policy 
lending from the Agricultural Bank of China (Maswana, 2008). It runs under the direct 
administration of the State Council and its main role is to offer short-term loans to state 
agencies that are responsible for the procurement of agricultural products. Furthermore it 
was responsible for funding projects that help the poor in the countryside and also general 
agricultural development projects (Lardy, 1998). In 1998 businesses related to poverty 
alleviation, comprehensive agricultural development and sideline business of grain and 
cotton enterprises carried out by Agricultural Development Bank of China was transferred to 
state-owned commercial banks. Agricultural Development Bank of China was assigned to 
manage the funds for purchasing grain, cotton and edible oil. In 2004 the bank widened its 
cope of operation by expanding its loans from traditional state-owned grain, cotton and 
edible oil enterprises first to multi-ownership ones and later also to agricultural flagship 
enterprises and agricultural processing enterprises (ADBC, 2009). 
Profit was not the main purpose of their existence and policy banks were 
characterised by similar problems as all the other banks in China owned by the state: poor 
management and high ratio of non-performing loans. Agricultural Development Bank of 
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China ranks among one of the least profitable financial institutions in China. Its average 
return on assets from 1998 to 2006 was 0,04% (The Asian Banker, 2009). In the more recent 
period of 2002-2006 (Table 2), its ratio of non-performing loans was very high even 
compared to other policy banks. Other banks also have low profitability, though China 
Development Bank managed to significantly decrease the NPLs ratio. And what is interesting, 
generally policy banks are doing better than the state-owned commercial banks when we 
compare their indicators with the ones shown in Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 
3.1.2. State-owned commercial banks 
 The state-owned commercial banks: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank 
of China, Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction Bank are called “the big four”. 
They represent around 60 % of China’s banking sector measured in terms of total assets (Fig. 
3). They developed from national banks with specified functions. Agricultural Bank of China 
was originally established to provide loans to the agricultural and rural sectors. Bank of 
China primarily specialized in international transactions like foreign exchange services and 
trade credit. China Construction Bank initially was mandated to provide middle and long 
term credit for investment. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was initially set up to 
offer working-capital loans to urban industrial and commercial sectors. As the financial 
reform progressed, these primary specified functions became less clear (Neftci, Ménager-Xu, 
2006).  
The four banks officially diverged from their initial functions in 1994 when the state-
directed lending was handed over to the three newly established policy banks. From now on 
they were to concentrate on commercial business. However the legacy of their past lending 
kept on hindering their profitability and earnings (Hansakul, 2004). The state still owns the 
banks and interferes with the business, which results in weak internal control and no 
efficient risk management or incentive mechanism. And this in turn is a reason for poor 
operational performance (Chen, Shih, 2004). 
As shown in Fig. 4 return on assets of state-owned commercial banks lagged behind 
other commercial banks in the period from 2002 to 2005. Both joint-stock commercial banks 
and city commercial banks have higher levels of ROA up until 2005. Only recently state-
owned commercial banks have reached the levels of other commercial banks and even 
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exceeded them. Analogous results are from the analysis of figures for return on equity (Fig. 
5). ROE of other commercial banks was significantly higher than state-owned banks, and 
joint-stock commercial banks reached higher levels than all the other banks up until 2007. 
Figure 4 ROA of Chinese commercial banks (2003-2007) 
 
Source: Rowe, Shi, Wang, 2009 
Hansakul (2004) compares ROA of two state-owned commercial banks, Bank of China 
and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, with two joint-stock commercial banks, China 
Merchants Bank and Pudong New Development Bank, in the earlier period – from 1997 to 
2002 and similar results can be seen. State-owned commercial banks have significantly lower 
indicators than joint-stock commercial banks throughout the given period. Thus they were 
less profitable from the beginning of the reforms and could finally catch up only in 2005. 
The performance of the big four can be affected by old and unadjusted to 
commercial business corporate culture – they are still run similarly to state firms, with senior 
management selected by the government (Hansakul, 2004). McGee (2008) draws attention 
to another issue – employment. State-owned commercial banks have very high numbers of 
employees, they are on the top front among banks in the world. This fact combined with low 
profits per employee and mentioned before low return on assets indicates very low both 
efficiency and competitiveness.  
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Figure 5 ROE of Chinese commercial banks (2003-2007) 
 
Source: Rowe, Shi, Wang, 2009 
Fu and Heffernan (2009) tested the quiet-life hypothesis on the big four. The 
hypothesis says that companies with greater market power prefer more relaxed business 
environment and less effort is put into achieving the highest cost efficiency. This relaxed 
management could be one of the causes for inefficiency of the state-owned banks. It turned 
out that the state banks in China do not enjoy quiet life, possibly due to the fact that interest 
rates are controlled by the government and this prevents them from earning monopoly 
profits. 
Well known problem of China’s banking sector is the large amount of non-performing 
loans. According to China Banking Regulatory Commission at the end of 2006 NPLs of all 
commercial banks reached 1 254,92 billion RMB, which accounted for 7,09% of all loans in 
the sector. The vast majority, 1 053,49 billion RMB, belonged to state-owned commercial 
banks, and this represented 9,22% of their loans. However, in comparison to the past results 
these levels indicate an improvement in quality of loans. Fig. 6 presents how the ratio of 
NPLs in state-owned commercial banks changed over time.  We see that since 1988 up until 
2005 it did not fell under 10% and in 1998 it reached 33%. These very high levels of NPLs 
signal that business efficiency and corporate governance are far from optimal (Muroi, 2007). 
It is worth adding that there are estimations like in Matthews, Guo and Zhang (2007) or 
Wong and Wong (2001) that provide even higher levels of NPLs. 
24 
 
One of the main reasons for such high NPLs rates is the fact that on the shoulders of 
the state-owned commercial banks was put the responsibility of keeping state-owned 
enterprises alive (Wong, Wong, 2001). And state-owned enterprises very often treated bank 
credit as government grant and used it to finance circulating capital and fixed investment. 
And the banks had no possibility to pass on the burden (Huang, 2006). 
Figure 6 NPLs of China’s state-owned commercial banks (1984-2005) 
 
Source: Huang (2006) 
Finally the government became concerned with the growing number of NPLs. In 
1999-2000 four asset management companies (AMC) were established. Their aim was to 
deal with the problem of bad assets in the state-owned commercial banks. AMC took over a 
sum of 1,3 trillion RMB of NPLs from the big-four (Hu, 2006). In 2003 the bank restructuring 
plan was initiated.  As part of this plan the government, using special companies,  injected 
into Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank capital in 
foreign currency reserves. From 2003 to 2005 the total injection reached $60 billion (Muroi, 
2007). Additionally there were further takeovers of the NPLs. The reform resulted in 
impressive improvement of the balance sheets of the banks: their NPLs ratios were much 
lower and Tier 1 capital  adequacy ratios grew significantly (Hu, 2006). 
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Table 3 Distribution of NPLs of major commercial banks in 2006 (by industry) (excluding 
foreign banks) 
Industries/Items Outstanding 
Balance 
(RMB 100 million) 
Share 
in total 
loans (%) 
 Total Loans   12511,23 7,27 
 A. Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishing   980,86 46,09 
 B. Mining   135,01 3,74 
 C. Manufacturing   4467,21 10,4 
 D. Production and Supply of Electricity, Gas and Water   325,33 2,18 
 E. Construction   225,71 4,27 
 F. Transport, Storage and Post   325,31 2,01 
 G. Information Transmission, Computer Services and Software   140,52 5,33 
 H. Wholesale and Retail Trades   2379,59 17,3 
 I. Hotels and Catering Services   250,17 19,55 
 J. Financial Intermediation   42,6 1,38 
 K. Real Estate   952,65 6,61 
 L. Leasing and Business Services   713,31 10,61 
 M. Scientific Research, Technical Services and Geologic 
Prospecting   
62,89 13,6 
 N. Management of Water Conservancy, Environment and Public 
Facilities   
90,18 1,3 
 O. Services to Households and Other Services   129,22 4,78 
 P. Education   73,01 2,38 
 Q. Health, Social Security and Social Welfare   35,6 4,31 
 R. Culture, Sports and Entertainment   90,21 14,83 
 S. Public Management and Social Organizations   123,95 5,39 
 Loans to Overseas   16,89 9,44 
 Personal Loans  950,97 3,39 
 Of which, Personal Consumption Loans   474,51 2,03 
Source: CBRC 2006 Annual Report 
Most of NPLs in state-owned commercial banks were  generated in three sectors: the 
sector of farming, forestry, husbandry and fishery, manufacturing industry and the 
wholesale and retail sector. In 2003 together they amounted to nearly 75% of NPLs of the 
state-owned banks. The situation in the first sector is the worst - almost half of the loans 
given to the farming turns out to be non-performing (CBRC, 2004a). Similarly, when we take 
loans of major commercial banks (that is SOCB and JSCB) into consideration, the highest rate 
of NPLs is in farming, forestry, husbandry and fishery, as shown in Table 3. Also wholesale 
and retail trades as well as hotels and catering services had very high rates of NPLs.     
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3.1.3. Other commercial banks 
Two main groups under other commercial banks are joint-stock commercial banks 
and city commercial banks. First joint-stock commercial bank was Bank of Communications 
established in 1986. Afterwards came another 11 banks including the CITIC Commercial Bank, 
Shenzhen Development Bank and Guangdong Development Bank. The monopoly of state-
owned commercial banks was broken (Neftci, Ménager-Xu, 2006). Presently there are 13 
joint-stock commercial banks in China (Fig.2). Their share of the market has grown 
continuously at the expense of state-owned commercial banks and now they represent 
nearly 14% of the market in terms of assets (Fig.3).  
Until 1998 city commercial banks were called union banks. In spite of “union” in their 
names they were actually commercial banks with stock-holding features operating under the 
Law of Commercial Banks (Neftci, Ménager-Xu, 2006). There are currently 124 city 
commercial banks in China (Fig. 2). Owing to their history, mandate and capital strength, city 
commercial banks focus their business scope on the cities they are located in. The joint-stock 
commercial banks on the other hand can operate on national and regional level (Hansakul, 
2004). During the years city commercial banks expanded their market share as well, up to 
approximately 6% at the end of 2007 (Fig. 3).  
 According to Lin and Zhang (2009) in the years 1997-2004 the average ownership 
structure of the joint-stock commercial banks’ top then shareholders was the following: 
51,6% of the stock belonged to the state, private investors owned an average equity stake of 
4,6% and foreign investors 1,12%. In case of city commercial banks the state owned on 
average 35,87% of the stakes, approximately 24,37% was owned by private investors and 
1,35% by foreign investors. 
Fu and Heffernan (2009) point out that joint-stock commercial banks were set up to 
help in developing efficient banking system. Thus they are less likely to get engaged in the 
implementation of the state policy.  However their ownership structure still puts them at risk 
of this kind of lending. The majority of shares is owned by central or local governments and 
state-owned enterprises and they can influence the banks to extend credit to a selected 
group. City commercial banks, on the other hand, are mostly vulnerable to the influences 
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coming from the local governments, especially as very often they own a large bulk of their 
shares. Thus they can also be exposed to the pressure of policy lending (Tong, 2005). 
When compared to the state-owned, joint-stock commercial banks as well as city 
commercial banks have been significantly more profitable. Moreover their balance sheets 
are usually healthier (Tong, 2005). Until recently, other commercial banks kept a bigger 
proportion of government bonds, which indicates that they preferred safer, more liquid 
assets. Only lately pressure has been put on state-owned banks to improve their balance 
sheets and allocate more assets as government bonds (Riedel, Jin, Gao, 2007). As mentioned 
before when describing profitability of state-owned commercial banks, other commercial 
banks have generally achieved higher return on assets as well as higher return on equity (see 
Fig. 4 and Fig.5). The difference in profitability was even more pronounced in the 1990s. 
Then ROA of joint-stock commercial banks exceeded 1% while profitability of state-owned 
commercial banks was around 0,3% (Wong, Wong, 2001). In case of ROE in more recent 
years their results were actually comparable to results of two policy banks – China 
Development Bank and Agricultural Development Bank of China. Though levels of ROA, 
compared to the results of China Development Bank in 2002-2006, were lower. 
Table 4 NPLs of other commercial banks (1997-2006) 
 1997 1998 1999 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Joint-stock 
commercial banks 
11,80% 13,50% 17,13% 9,53% 6,50% 4,94% 4,22% 2,81% 
City commercial 
banks 
n/a n/a n/a 17,72% 12,85% n/a 7,73% 4,78% 
Sources: Wong, Wong, 2001; China Banking Regulatory Commission 
Healthier balance sheets can be also traced to better risk management. Furthermore, 
other commercial banks have significantly lower rate of non-performing loans than state-
owned commercial banks. When we compare the results from Table 4 with the ones from 
Fig. 6 we see that both types of other commercial banks had lower ratios of NPLs throughout 
the whole period. Moreover joint-stock commercial banks did definitely better - they had 
approximately  half of the NPLs ratio of city commercial banks.  
As opposed to state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock and city commercial banks  
were not subject to mandatory credit quotas before 1998. Since their establishment the 
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amount of loans they could extend was not limited. However they were somewhat limited in 
the types of loan services they could provide. Joint-stock commercial banks could handle 
loans backed by securities only at their head offices and city commercial banks could not 
handle them at all (Wong, Wong, 2001). 
3.1.4. Rural credit cooperatives 
 The cooperative sector can be divided into rural credit cooperatives, urban credit 
cooperatives, rural commercial and cooperative banks and village and township banks. 
Among them rural credit cooperatives are definitely the most numerous. At the end of 2007 
there were 8 348 of them operating in China (Fig. 2). As shown in Fig. 3, rural credit 
cooperatives own around 10% of the market in terms of assets. Recently their share has 
been declining slightly. Nonetheless they keep being the third major player on the Chinese 
market after state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks. 
 First rural credit cooperatives were established in late 1950s when each farmer was 
required to contribute a small amount of cash. After abandonment of colleting farming in 
1980s rural credit cooperatives continued as part of the state banking system. In 1990s they 
expanded rapidly and reached 49 000 in number (Hu, 2006). During the reforms in 2003 and 
2004 they were placed under provincial governments and merged into county- or provincial-
level RCC unions. A number of stronger rural credit cooperatives was restructured and 
transformed into provincial rural commercial banks or cooperative banks (Gale, Collender, 
2006). 
Shareholders, which normally are non-state sector rural households, are the owners 
of rural credit cooperatives. Nominally shareholders controlled the cooperative and its focus 
was on providing financing to its members. However in practice the control never really 
belonged to shareholders. Until 1996 rural credit cooperatives were supervised by 
Agricultural Bank of China, which actually controlled the funds. Also local governments 
managed to gain to some extent control over their operations (Laurenceson, Chai, 2003). In 
1996 the control was taken over by People’s Bank of China and from 2003 they are under 
China Banking Regulatory Commission. Very often local governments and officials make 
decisions instead of the farmers. There is also lack of transparency in their operations. All in 
all Xie (2006) argues that since the state gives implicit insurance on their deposits and 
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constantly interferes in their management and operations, rural credit cooperatives function 
more as local quasi state-owned banks. 
The cooperatives provide financing mainly to small and medium sized enterprises as 
well as individuals. They concentrate their business scope on their home township or county. 
Since 1978 they gradually increased the share of the deposits they collected in the rural 
areas that were used to finance rural economic activities. At the beginning it was only 27%. 
The reason for the low numbers was that until mid 1980s rural credit cooperatives hand over 
much of their funds to Agricultural Bank of China so that rural savings could be channelled to 
finance economic activities in rural areas. Additionally until 1984 there were high legal 
barriers against noneconomic rural activities and establishment of rural enterprises. When 
these conditions were changed the ratio could rise. In 1995 the percentage of deposits 
allocated to rural loans reached 73% (Huang et al., 2005).  
 The ratio of non-performing loans in rural credit cooperatives has been very high. 
There are estimates that it reached 50% of total lending (Hansakul, 2004). CBRC reported 
that at the end of 2003 NPLs amounted to 504,9 billion RMB, which was almost 30% of the 
total (2004b). While about 800 million people, nearly two thirds of China’s population, lives 
on the countryside, this makes rural sector extremely important. Thus the government is 
ready to financially support rural credit cooperatives in need (Hansakul, 2004). People’s Bank 
of China has given loans to rural credit cooperatives in order to support the increase in 
agricultural lending. In 2003 and 2004 the government decided to clean up some old NPLs by 
injecting around $20 billion into the cooperatives (Gale, Collender, 2006). 
3.2. State policies concerning financial sector and economic growth 
 Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008) stress that it is the government that has major 
influence on the way financial system in each country operates, moreover it determines the 
extent to which large parts of financial system have access to financial services. The degree 
of political and economic stability as well as the functioning of legal, regulatory and 
information frameworks depend hugely the government’s actions and they all influence 
financial system performance. Moreover the government can decide on the ownership of 
financial institutions and the extent of contestability by domestic and foreign firms. Let’s 
examine how the Chinese government deals with the above aspects of state influence. 
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 Maswana (2008) stresses that Chinese government has a broad range of tools to 
implement its financial policies that need to respect country’s development goals. The 
People’s Bank of China, Chinese central bank, is not independent from the government and 
has to ensure that its actions are compatible with other development policies and financial 
system stability. 
 Firstly, the government can control the level of bank competition. Immediately 
comes the question what level is optimal? On the one hand higher competition means lower 
entry barriers, fewer regulatory limitations on bank activities, greater banking freedom and 
generally better institutional development (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2008). On the other 
hand there are fears that higher competition might destabilize banking sector. However, 
recent studies (e.g. Berger et al., 2004; Beck, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004) 
have revealed that bank competition has positive effect on efficiency, stability and firms’ 
access to financing. Ownership structure is another crucial matter for the government, 
unavoidably connected with the competition issue. Empirical studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 
2002; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Martinez Peria, 2007) provide 
the evidence that foreign banks have usually positive effect on the system, state ownership 
however is connected with less and lower quality of access to financial services as well as 
greater fragility. State ownership of banks can be a cause of lower level of financial 
development and lower economic growth. Banks owned by the government have tendency 
to grant credit to politically-favoured and economically not feasible projects (Sapienza, 2004; 
Cole, 2005; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006). 
These results would imply the necessity of removing obstacles to foreign entry and 
implementing bank privatization policies.  
In China first economic reforms were implemented in 1978, but changes in the 
banking sector came several years later. About competition we can talk since 1985 when the 
government decided to lift restrictions limiting the four existing state banks to perform in 
different sectors. This competition was very limited though and only in 1994 it was increased 
by establishing policy banks that took over policy loans and renaming the big four state 
banks as “commercial banks”. Still the separation was far from perfect, and commercial 
banks continued to take part in policy lending. Up until now when it comes to assets the big 
four definitely dominates the market. The government actually eliminated competition 
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when it comes to price due to strict control of the interest rates for different kinds of 
deposits and this forced banks to attract customers by their financial fundamentals and 
quality of service. The central bank decides as well on the range within which other banks 
can determine their loan interest rate. Interbank rates were liberalized in 1999. The 
government has also influenced the competition conditions by guaranteeing deposits in 
state commercial banks giving them more protection. The guarantee means that these state 
banks cannot fail (Wong, Wong, 2001). Therefore, in spite of some progress, institutional 
arrangements in China inhibit efficient and effective competition in domestic banking sector. 
Financial liberalization can be a complicated policy to implement. Deregulation of 
interest rates and more open policies of entry generally proved to induce financial 
development, especially in counties were financial system was initially repressed. Entry of 
foreign banks eventually increases competition, develops efficiency and improves the quality 
of services (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria, 
Sanchez, 2003). However, to ensure that financial liberalization will be successful, effective 
contractual and supervisory environment must be prepared (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2008). In China first  new banks appeared on the market in 1986. The policy of introducing 
new institutions was very careful and strict, especially when it comes to foreign banks. There 
were geographical restriction – foreign banks were allowed to operate only in certain cities. 
Furthermore there were restrictions on the services they could provide, for example they 
were banned from RMB services for local customers (Jacob, 2007). Yet entry restriction 
policies can also serve as a way to create rent opportunities so that banks have incentives to 
invest in deposit mobilisation (Maswana, 2008). As mentioned before interest rates have 
been strictly controlled. However Maswana (2008) does not consider it an obstacle for 
growth. He argues that this policy is significant to maintain the incentives for households and 
enterprises to expand their financial asset positions. 
Access to financial services is gaining importance as another aspect of financial 
policies. According to modern development theory the lack of such access can lead to 
persistent income inequality and slower economic growth. Financing obstacles were found 
to be one of the main constraints for firms’ growth. These obstacles affect households as 
well – for example with no access to credit they might not have funds to educate children, 
and child labour can increase (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2008). Maswana (2008) suggests 
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that reduced availability of credit and other financial services or heavy costs imposed on 
taxpayers results from the fear for financial instability that could negatively affect 
effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Impact of bank concentration frequently depends on regulatory and institutional 
system, thus it is advised for governments to concentrate on improving these underlying 
environments as well as ownership structure in order to support contestable financial 
system rather than seek to decrease the concentration levels in the banking sector 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2008). Cai (2006) argues that high concentration is not 
necessary bad – especially in countries where banks’ performance is discontent it might 
actually result in higher financial stability. In China there is high concentration in the banking 
sector due to large state-ownership and not many banks are actually profit-oriented. Though 
it is worth mentioning that in the last two decades the degree of concentration in China had 
fallen somewhat and this trend is set to be maintained (Cai, 2006). 
Direct credit controls is another policy instrument used by the Chinese authorities. In 
1988 direct credit control was applied for credit extended by specialized and universal banks 
as well as nonbank financial institutions and direct financing of firms. Credit plan contained 
ceiling for credit in the economy and assessed its compatibility with macroeconomic targets 
and objectives. The Peoples Bank of China decided on credit ceilings for state-owned banks 
as well as different types of loans such as working capital loans and investment loans (Tseng 
et al., 1994). The government influenced the banks’ lending decisions through direct credit 
controls until 1998 when the credit plan was abolished (Wong, Wong, 2001). The central 
government wanted the investment funds to go to strategic sectors like raw materials and 
energy and opted for infrastructure investment as well as investment for technical upgrading 
of SOEs (Girardin, 1997). 
Maybe financial policies can be seen as repressive but Chinese authorities have 
proven that they can be successful at ensuring domestic financial stability and resistance to 
external shocks. The government has kept the whole financial system under control and 
prevented financial institutions from engaging in risky actions like taking up foreign currency 
or derivative risks, which could result in the type of crisis that affected majority of the East 
Asian countries in 1997. Chinese currency, RMB, is only partially convertible - limited on the 
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current account but not on capital account transactions. This makes the currency less 
exposed to speculative attacks (Maswana, 2008). 
3.3.  How financial sector can affect economic growth in China? 
 Based on this chapter’s analysis of financial sector in China and accompanying state 
policies I would expect the development of the four biggest types of banking institutions: 
state-owned commercial banks, policy banks, other commercial banks and rural credit 
cooperatives, to be mostly linked with economic growth. The direction of causality should 
vary due to different management abilities, level of government involvement and goals of 
business activity that these institutions represent. 
   State-owned commercial banks are characterised by strong sate involvement and 
although their aim is to be profitable, high level of non-performing loans as well as low 
returns on assets and equity throughout the analysed period indicate that their risk 
management and allocation of loans is not the best. Furthermore they have been burdened 
by supporting state-owned enterprises. However, they enjoyed privileged treatment from 
the government. Considered all that I expect their development has followed economic 
growth. 
 Similarly, in policy banks the government would decide on allocation of loans and the 
profitability of these banks was far from optimal. However, they did slightly better than the 
state-owned banks and profitability was not their main objective. Through them the 
government could support selected industries. If we suppose that market forces would be 
better at allocating the loans, then the causality should also go from economic growth to 
their development. 
 Joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks are institutions that are 
mostly directed towards profits and commercial lending. The influence of the government is 
of lesser extent and they have the lowest number of non-performing loans in their portfolio. 
Thus I would suspect they can induce economic growth. 
 The state interferes in the management of rural credit cooperatives and these 
institutions are plagued with high ratios of non-performing loans. This would suggest bad 
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allocation of loans. However, these institutions are not troubled with responsibility for 
financing SOEs. They rather lend to individuals and township and village enterprises. This 
might indicate that there is either two-way causality or one-way causality from the 
development of RCC to economic growth.      
 In the next chapters I will choose the appropriate variables to set up a VAR model and 
test the above hypotheses by applying Granger causality tests. 
4. Data and description of variables 
The main part of the data used in this thesis comes from the compilation of financial 
statistical data published by the Financial Survey and Statistics Department of the People’s 
Bank of China. The data disaggregation is a strength of this newly released paper. They allow 
us to look closer at the performance of different banks and conduct comparison analysis. 
Originally they cover the period from 1949 to 2005 though in the study only the time after 
the reforms in 1978 will be analysed. Additionally, for the indicators outside of the banking 
sector the data from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook for 2008 are applied. 
Following previous studies (e.g. Khan, 1999; Levine, 2000) the natural logarithm of 
the real per capita GDP is used as an indication of economic growth. Real GDP is calculated 
as nominal GDP divided by GDP deflator (1978=100) and the ratio of real GDP to total 
population gives us real per capita GDP. Heston (1994) suggests that real per capita GDP 
serves better as a measure in an analysis than total real GDP due to the fact that some of the 
common errors that are expected in the estimation of GDP and population are likely to 
counterbalance each other.  
4.1. Indicators of financial development 
Maswana (2006) suggests three indexes to proxy the development of the financial 
sector: financial deepening (M3/GDP), credit expenditure to the private sector by banks and 
ratio of total credit extended to the entire economy. 
The first variable represents financial intermediary development. De Gregorio and 
Guidotti (1995) argue that monetary aggregates can be a good approximation of financial 
development since they are characterised by high correlation with the ability of financial 
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sectors to provide liquidity or transaction services as well as the ability of financial 
institutions to channel funds from agents willing to save to the ones that want to borrow. 
Maswana (2006) uses M3/GDP ratio to proxy that and points out that in developing 
economies, such as China, the role of capital markets is generally very small, and liquid 
aggregate like M1 would be related mostly to the ability of financial system to provide 
liquidity and serving as means of exchange. The case of monetary overhang in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union can be a good illustration why M1 might not be the best 
financial indicator – before the economic reforms these countries were characterized by 
high levels of monetization, which naturally was not a result of financial development. Since 
the ability of financial system to allocate credit is regarded as more related to investment 
and growth, researchers like Gelb (1989) or King and Levine (1993) tend to use least liquid 
aggregate, M3, when doing research on such countries. However in this thesis I will have to 
apply M2/GDP ratio due to the fact that data for M2 in China are more accessible, official 
and up to date. Also King and Levine (1993) use M2 in their study when M3 statistics are not 
available. Therefore the financial intermediary development indicator in this thesis will 
measure the sum of cash in circulation and all deposits of Chinese economy divided by GDP. 
In this thesis I will take advantage of the more detailed data and break down the 
banks’ credit expansion firstly into amounts of credit granted by different types of banks and 
then into different types of loans. Credits from the following categories of  banks were used 
in the analysis: policy banks, state-owned banks, other commercial banks and rural credit 
cooperatives. Policy banks include China Development Bank, The Export – Import Bank of 
China and the Agricultural Development Bank of China. The category of state - owned 
commercial banks consists of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of 
China, Bank of China and China Construction Bank. Finally other commercial banks include 
Bank of Communications, China CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, Guangdong 
Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank, Industrial Bank, China Minsheng Banking Corporation, Evergrowing Bank, 
China Zheshang Bank. 
Loans are divided into: loans to industrial sector, loans to commercial sector, loans to 
construction sector, loans to agricultural sector, capital construction loans, technical 
improvement loans and finally other medium and long – term loans. Loans to industrial 
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sector, loans to commercial sector, loans to construction sector and loans to agricultural 
sector are working capital loans issued by financial institutions with maturity equal to or less 
than one year. The rest of the categories are loans issued by financial institutions with 
maturity longer than one year and are used for capital construction, technology upgrading 
etc. 
As for the expenditure to the private sector, Maswana (2006) is not the only one 
suggesting to use this measurement. Beck et al (2000), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) or 
Khan (2000) recommend as well to restrict the credit by financial institutions to the private 
sector. This should exclude credits granted to the government, companies owned by the 
state or government agencies as well as credit issued by the central bank and development 
banks. However, as Liang and Teng (2006) point out, it is very difficult to apply it for the data 
of a transition economy like China. Furthermore in this study the point is to compare 
different banks of China that can affect growth, which includes the development ones. Only 
the central bank, due to its specific properties and functions concerning state administration, 
is excluded from the analysis. 
Moreover the proxy of financial development could be more accurate if the data of 
the securities market had been included. Though, as mentioned in the previous section, in 
spite of its rapid growth the influence of Chinese stock market is still very limited and cannot 
be compared to the banking sector. Additionally due to its late introduction – in 1990, just 
including it together with the measures of the banking sector as an indicator of financial 
development could cause a problem of a structural break. 
 Basing on the paper by Maswana (2006) the end-of-year values from the balance 
sheet of banking institutions – here credit issued by different banks and values of different 
types of loans -  are divided by nominal GDP. 
4.2. Control variables 
 In the analysis we also include control variables that are associated with studies on 
economic growth. The first one is used as proxy of physical capital. Following Boyreau-
Debray (2003) and Maswana (2006), we include the ratio of foreign direct investment flows 
to GDP. The proxy shows the degree of integration into the world economy, it controls for 
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external factors that can influence economic growth like openness to trade and external 
financing. The second variable controls for the influence of human capital on growth. 
Boyreau-Debray (2003) uses share of population with more than secondary schooling as the 
proxy of human capital. Since these data are unavailable, as the proxy I use number of 
graduates from institutions of higher education instead. All variables in the dataset are 
converted into natural logarithms in order to be able to interpret them in terms of growth 
when the first difference is taken. 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables described above that were 
used further in the study. The variables exhibit large variation. The highest dispersion among 
loans to different sectors is among capital construction loans, loans to commercial sector 
and other medium and long term loans. When it comes to credit extended by different 
banks, the share of joint-stock and city commercial banks’ credit in China’s gdp changed the 
most. Credit extended by state-owned banks as well as loans to industrial and commercial 
sectors had on average the biggest share in GDP. Data on national accounts is available for a 
long period, also data on loans to most of the sectors is there for more than 20 years. 
However information on credit extended by different institutions is more limited. As a result 
part of the analysis is conducted for the years 1996-2005, for which coherent data for all 
types of banks are available. 
Table 6 and Table 7 present the correlation matrixes of the variables. Table 6 focuses 
on the first version of equation (1), where different types of loans are analysed. Table 7 
reports the correlation of the variables from the second version of equation (1), in which 
credit extended by different banking institutions is included. As we would expect, both 
control variables are positively correlated with economic growth. Also money supply is 
positively correlated with GDP growth. The correlation between financial variables and 
growth varies among different types of loans. Loans to agricultural sector, capital 
construction loans and other medium and long term loans are positively correlated with 
growth. The rest is characterised by negative correlation. Very high positive correlation (0,99) 
exists between loans to commercial and industrial sector, however there is no indication 
that all short term loans are positively correlated with each other. Similarly, medium and 
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long-term loans do not have the same direction of correlation with each other. As the 
correlations are not too high, this may be a sign that it should be possible for the model to 
identify individual effects of these variables. 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Median Max Min 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
GDP GROWTH 8,475 8,606 13,706 2,329 2,801 -0,319 3,058 28 
Control variables 
EDUCATION 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,000 0,001 1,955 6,776 28 
FDI 85,420 63,102 315,380 29,047 69,532 1,957 6,538 23 
Financial variables 
M2 1,225 1,195 1,632 0,819 0,282 0,168 1,577 16 
Loans to sectors 
INDUSTRIAL 
SECTOR 
0,194 0,188 0,272 0,123 0,036 0,484 2,718 28 
AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR 
0,062 0,059 0,118 0,024 0,022 0,620 3,495 28 
CAPITAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
0,091 0,060 0,220 0,003 0,076 0,525 1,850 20 
COMMERCIAL 
SECTOR 
0,254 0,289 0,339 0,090 0,074 -0,761 2,391 28 
CONSTRUCTION 
SECTOR 
0,049 0,050 0,085 0,026 0,013 0,899 4,337 21 
TECHNICAL 
IMPROVMENT 
0,042 0,048 0,072 0,010 0,021 -0,264 1,502 22 
OTHER 
MEDIUM AND 
LONG TERM 
LOANS 
0,071 0,025 0,246 0,002 0,085 1,131 2,808 18 
Credit by types of banks 
POLICY BANKS 0,139 0,138 0,154 0,124 0,008 -0,078 2,908 10 
STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 
0,596 0,591 0,642 0,526 0,038 -0,312 2,158 10 
OTHER 
COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 
0,069 0,033 0,183 0,008 0,067 0,727 1,804 14 
RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES 
0,072 0,085 0,125 0,012 0,035 -0,407 1,939 28 
 
 Growth is also likely to be associated with credit extended by joint-stock commercial 
banks and city banks. However credit given by policy and state-owned banks does not move 
in the same direction. Both are negatively correlated with growth as well as credit extended 
by other commercial banks. Credit from state-owned banks is only positively correlated with 
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credit extended by rural credit cooperatives. This may be connected to the fact that one of 
the state-owned commercial banks had control over rural credit cooperatives for a long time, 
and then cooperatives were similarly supervised as quasi state-banks.   
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Table 6 Correlation matrix for the equation with different types of loans 
 GDP 
GROWTH 
FDI EDU. M2 AGRICULT. 
SECTOR 
CAPITAL  
CONST. 
COMMER. 
SECTOR 
CONSTR. 
SECTOR 
INDUSTRIAL 
SECTOR 
OTHER 
MEDIUM 
AND 
LONG 
TERM 
LOANS 
TECHNICAL 
IMPROV. 
GDP GROWTH 1,00 0,84 0,34 0,32 0,22 0,33 -0,33 -0,27 -0,29 0,23 -0,24 
FDI 0,84 1,00 0,14 -0,04 0,48 0,00 0,01 -0,25 0,04 0,00 0,01 
EDUCATION 0,34 0,14 1,00 0,77 0,09 0,85 -0,85 -0,58 -0,80 0,80 -0,88 
M2 0,32 -0,04 0,77 1,00 -0,34 0,98 -0,98 -0,45 -0,97 0,82 -0,90 
AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR 
0,22 0,48 0,09 -0,34 1,00 -0,22 0,31 -0,52 0,41 -0,15 0,04 
CAPITAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
0,33 0,00 0,85 0,98 -0,22 1,00 -0,98 -0,51 -0,95 0,84 -0,94 
COMMERCIAL 
SECTOR 
-0,33 0,01 -0,85 -0,98 0,31 -0,98 1,00 0,49 0,99 -0,87 0,92 
CONSTRUCTION 
SECTOR 
-0,27 -0,25 -0,58 -0,45 -0,52 -0,51 0,49 1,00 0,43 -0,58 0,61 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR -0,29 0,04 -0,80 -0,97 0,41 -0,95 0,99 0,43 1,00 -0,87 0,86 
OTHER MEDIUM 
AND LONG TERM 
LOANS 
0,23 0,00 0,80 0,82 -0,15 0,84 -0,87 -0,58 -0,87 1,00 -0,84 
TECHNICAL 
IMPROVEMENT 
-0,24 0,01 -0,88 -0,90 0,04 -0,94 0,92 0,61 0,86 -0,84 1,00 
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Table 7 Correlation matrix for the equation with different types of banks 
 GDP 
GROWTH 
EDUCATION FDI M2 POLICY 
BANKS 
STATE 
BANKS 
OTHER 
COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 
RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES 
GDP GROWTH 1,00 0,78 0,90 0,48 -0,60 -0,49 0,72 0,34 
EDUCATION 0,78 1,00 0,69 0,79 -0,40 -0,39 0,89 0,46 
FDI 0,90 0,69 1,00 0,26 -0,80 -0,59 0,53 0,07 
M2 0,48 0,79 0,26 1,00 -0,20 0,09 0,94 0,85 
POLICY BANKS -0,60 -0,40 -0,80 -0,20 1,00 0,28 -0,40 -0,15 
STATE BANKS -0,49 -0,39 -0,59 0,09 0,28 1,00 -0,12 0,46 
OTHER 
COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 
0,72 0,89 0,53 0,94 -0,40 -0,12 1,00 0,76 
RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES 
0,34 0,46 0,07 0,85 -0,15 0,46 0,76 1,00 
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5. Empirical analysis 
 This section presents the empirical analysis of the influence of financial development 
on economic growth in China. I examine two aspects of the issue: the impact of different 
types of banks and the impact of different kind of loans. First, I present the growth model for 
each aspect and discuss the econometric method, which includes unit root and cointegration 
test procedures as well as causality tests. Second, I present and discuss the results. 
5.1. Model specification 
 Based on the previous discussion of the characteristics of financial sector in China, I 
set up a simple model equation to test the hypothesis that different types of banking 
institutions as well as loans of different purpose may have different effect on economic 
growth in China. 
 The basic growth equation can be presented as: 
    (1) 
where Y is the real per capita GDP, X is a vector of financial development measures, Z is a 
vector of control variables, ε is the error term and t is a time subscript. 
 Equation (1) will be used in two variants. The first one will include money supply and 
loans extended from different types of banks that will be used as measures of financial 
development. In the second one measures of financial development will consist of money 
supply and different types of loans. 
 Following Maswana (2006) the process of estimation and testing of each variant of 
equation (1) is divided into three stages: a study of the integration order of the variables, a 
test for cointegration of time series and application of the Granger causality test. 
5.2. Stationarity test procedure 
 When mean, variances and covariances of the series do not change over time, we call 
the process stationary. In order to transform nonstationary time series  into a stationary 
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one we have to differentiate it  -number of times. A series which becomes stationary after 
first differencing is said to be integrated of order one, denoted I (1). The order of integration 
can be determined by applying a unit root test, augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Verbeek, 
2008). The estimated equation is the following: 
   (2) 
where  is the drift parameter. Equation (2) can be also estimated without a trend term by 
eliminating . The null hypothesis of a unit root  against (stationarity)  is 
tested. 
5.3. Cointegration test procedure 
 If it is determined that the time series is nonstationary, it is necessary to test for 
cointegration. As Engle and Granger (1987) point out, it is possible that a linear combination 
of nonstatoinary series will be stationary. If such a stationary combination does exist, the 
non-stationary time series are said to be cointegrated. Then it is possible to interpret it as a 
long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables. I use the method developed by 
Johansen (1991, 1995a) to perform cointegration tests. 
  We consider nonstationary time series as a vector autoregression (VAR) of order p: 
   (3) 
where: 
 ,       ,   (4) 
and  is a k-vector of non stationary I(1) variables,   is a d-vector of deterministic variables, 
and  is a vector of innovations. 
 According to Granger’s representation theorem, if the coefficient matrix   has 
reduced rank r<k, then there exist k x r matrices α and β each with rank r such that =αβ’ 
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and β’  is I(0). Here r is the number of cointegrating relations and each column of β is the 
cointegrating vector. The elements of α are the adjustment parameters. In Johansen’s 
method our objective is to estimate the  matrix from an unrestricted VAR and to test 
whether we can reject the restrictions implied by the reduced rank of . There are two test 
statistics: the trace statistic and the maximum eigenvalue statistic. The first one tests the 
null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of k cointegrating relations. 
The second one tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative 
of r+1 cointegrating vectors (Quantitative Micro Software, 2005). 
5.4. Causality tests procedure 
 In order to test causality, Granger (1969) suggests a procedure, in which we examine 
how much of the current value of Y can be explained by past values of Y and then we look 
whether adding lagged values of X can improve the explanation. X is said to Granger cause Y 
if X helps in the prediction of Y, or equally if the coefficients on the lagged X’s are statistically 
significant. 
 To select the lag order under VAR model, the sequential modified likelihood ratio (LR) 
criterion will be computed. The χ^2 test statistic is: 
  (5) 
where m is the number of parameters per equation under the alternative, l is the lag order, 
and (T-m) indicates small sample modification. The tested null hypothesis is that the 
coefficients on lag l are jointly zero. 
 Under the VAR model, for all possible pairs of (y, x) series in the group following 
bivariate regressions are performed: 
                (6) 
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where α and β are coefficients and  and  are error terms. 
The test statistic is the Wald statistic for the joint hypothesis: 
 (7) 
The null hypothesis is that X does not Granger-cause Y in the first regression and that 
Y does not Granger-cause X in the second regression. 
6. Results 
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are performed on all series to examine their 
properties.  The ADF test results presented in Table 8a suggest that at the 1% significance 
level we cannot reject the null hypothesis for any variable, which means that the unit root 
problem exists and the series are nonstationary. Almost all the variables have unit roots both 
when we include intercept and when we include intercept and trend. RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES and CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION have unit roots when both intercept and trend 
is included. POLICY BANKS and OTHER MEDIUM AND LONG TERM LOANS have unit roots 
when only intercept is included. The first differences of all the variables (Table 8b) are tested 
to be stationary at the significance level of 10%. This implies that the series are I(1) in log-
levels and I(0) in first log differences. 
  Since the series are known to be nonstationary, it is valid to carry out the Johansen 
cointegration test. The number of cointegrating vectors is tested based on the assumption 
that the series have linear deterministic trend and there is intercept in cointegrating 
equations. The lag length of 2 in levels is determined based on Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). 
The trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue statistics for the given variables are 
presented in Tables 10 - 23. The null hypothesis of no cointegrating relations was rejected at 
the significance level of 5% in all of the tests. The null hypothesis of one cointegrating 
equation was rejected in all of the tests as well. Yet the null hypothesis of two cointegrating 
equations was not rejected at the significance level of 5%, except for GDP GROWTH and 
STATE BANKS where it was not rejected at the significance level of 10%. The maximum 
eigenvalue statistics showed no cointegrating equations for GDP GROWTH and M2, GDP 
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GROWTH and CONSTRUCTION SECTOR, GDP GROWTH and COMMERCIAL SECTOR, GDP 
GROWTH and OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS, GDP GROWTH and EDUCATION as well as GDP 
GROWTH and OTHER MEDIUM AND LONG TERM LOANS. However due to the fact that trace 
statistics are more robust than maximal eigenvalue statistics in testing cointegration vectors 
(e.g. Cheung, Kai, 1993; Kasa, 1992; Liang, Teng, 2006) I assume the results given by trace 
statistics to be more adequate. Thus there is cointegration between economic growth and all 
financial development variables. This in turn indicates a long-run equilibrium relationship 
among the variables and is consistent with the theory of finance and growth. 
Table 8 Unit root test results (level) 
Variable ADF test 
statistic 
(Intercept) 
Critical values ADF test 
statistic 
(trend & 
intercept) 
Critical values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
GDP GROWTH -3,71 -
3,74 
-
2,99 
-
2.64 
-3,31 -
4,44 
-
3,63 
-
3,25 
FDI -2,22 -
3,79 
-
3,01 
-
2,65 
-2,30 -
4,47 
-
3,64 
-
3,26 
EDUCATION -0,92 -
3,72 
-
2,98 
-
2,63 
-2,53 -
4,36 
-
3,60 
-
3,23 
M2 -1,14 -
3,96 
-
3,08 
-
2,68 
-2,67 -
4,80 
-
3,79 
-
3,34 
POLICY BANKS -0,36 -
4,58 
-
3,32 
-
2,80 
-20,81 -
5,52 
-
4,10 
-
3,51 
STATE BANKS -4,33 -
4,58 
-
3,32 
-
2,80 
-3,32 -
5,83 
-
4,24 
-
3,59 
OTHER COMM. 
BANKS 
-0,54 -
4,07 
-
3,12 
-2,7 -2,43 -
4,99 
-
3,87 
-
3,38 
RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES 
-4,93 -
3,71 
-
2,98 
-
2,63 
-2,09 -
4,35 
-
3,59 
-
3,23 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR -1,96 -
3,70 
-
2,98 
-
2,63 
-2,07 -
4,33 
-
3,58 
-
3,22 
COMMERCIAL SECTOR 3,19 -
3,70 
-
2,98 
-
2,63 
0,37 -
4,33 
-
3,58 
-
3,22 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR -0,11 -
3,70 
-
2,98 
-
2,62 
0,01 -
4,33 
-
3,58 
-
3,22 
CONSTRUCTION SECTOR -2,31 -
3,83 
-
3,02 
-
2,65 
-2,09 -
4,53 
-
3,67 
-
3,27 
CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION -3,91 -
3,85 
-
3,04 
-
2,66 
-1,60 -
4,99 
-
3,87 
-
3,38 
TECHNICAL 
IMPROVEMENT 
-1,29 -
3,80 
-
3,02 
-
2,65 
-3,13 -
4,99 
-
3,87 
-
3,38 
OTHER MEDIUM AND 
LONG TERM LOANS 
0,06 -
4,12 
-
3,14 
-
2,71 
-4,67 -
4,66 
-
3,73 
-
3,31 
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Table 9 Unit root test results (first difference) 
Variable ADF test 
statistic 
(Intercept) 
Critical values ADF test 
statistic 
(trend & 
intercept) 
Critical values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
GDP GROWTH -4,16 -
3,80 
-
3,02 
-
2,65 
-3,98 -
4,49 
-
3,65 
-
3,29 
FDI -3,58 -
3,78 
-
3,01 
-
2,64 
-3,48 -
4,46 
-
3,64 
-
3,26 
EDUCATION -7,83 -
3,71 
-
2,98 
-
2,62 
-3,22 -
4,37 
-
3,60 
-
3,23 
M2 -2,90 -
4,00 
-
3,09 
-
2,69 
-2,80 -
4,80 
-
3,79 
-
3,34 
POLICY BANKS -20,42 -
4,58 
-
3,32 
-
2,80 
-16,11 -
5,83 
-
4,24 
-
3,59 
STATE BANKS -3,49 -
4,80 
-
3,40 
-
2,84 
-3,92 -
6,29 
-
4,45 
-
3,70 
OTHER COMM. 
BANKS 
-2,63 -
4,21 
-
3,14 
-
2,71 
-3,66 -
5,52 
-
4,10 
-
3,51 
RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES 
-5,05 -
3,71 
-
2,98 
-
2,62 
-7,56 -
4,35 
-
3,59 
-
3,23 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR -4,43 -
3,71 
-
2,98 
-
2,62 
-4,35 -4, 
36 
-
3,59 
-
3,23 
COMMERCIAL SECTOR -2,47 -
3,71 
-
2,98 
-
2,62 
-3,49 -
4,35 
-
3,59 
-
3,23 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR -3,11 -
3,71 
-
2,98 
-
2,62 
-3,86 -
4,35 
-
3,59 
-
3,23 
CONSTRUCTION SECTOR -3,06 -
3,83 
-
3,02 
-
2,65 
-3,29 -
4,57 
-
3,69 
-
3,28 
CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION -3,30 -
4,58 
-
3,32 
-
2,80 
-7,33 -
4,99 
-
3,87 
-
3,38 
TECHNICAL 
IMPROVEMENT 
-2,20 -
3,92 
-
3,06 
-
2,67 
-4,67 -
4,57 
-
3,69 
-
3,28 
OTHER MEDIUM AND 
LONG TERM LOANS 
-4,18 -
4,12 
-
3,14 
-
2,71 
-3,74 -
4,99 
-
3,87 
-
3,38 
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Table 10 Johansen cointegration test for GDP ROWTH and POLICY BANKS 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.861060 25.26382 15.49471 0.0013 
At most 1 * 0.694029 9.474111 3.841466 0.0021 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.861060 15.78971 14.26460 0.0285 
At most 1 * 0.694029 9.474111 3.841466 0.0021 
 
Table 11 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and STATE BANKS 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.01 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.995661 46.74142 13.42878 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.331466 3.221343 2.705545 0.0727 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.01 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.995661 43.52008 12.29652 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.331466 3.221343 2.705545 0.0727 
 
Table 12 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.574151 17.48789 15.49471 0.0247 
At most 1 * 0.453190 7.243851 3.841466 0.0071 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None 0.574151 10.24404 14.26460 0.1964 
At most 1 * 0.453190 7.243851 3.841466 0.0071 
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Table 13 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and RURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.527301 33.00884 15.49471 0.0001 
At most 1 * 0.405642 13.52711 3.841466 0.0002 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.527301 19.48172 14.26460 0.0068 
At most 1 * 0.405642 13.52711 3.841466 0.0002 
 
Table 14 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.433286 18.70473 15.49471 0.0158 
At most 1 * 0.140592 3.939304 3.841466 0.0472 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.433286 14.76543 14.26460 0.0416 
At most 1 * 0.140592 3.939304 3.841466 0.0472 
 
Table 15 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.608185 20.94800 15.49471 0.0068 
At most 1 * 0.310842 5.956560 3.841466 0.0147 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.608185 14.99144 14.26460 0.0383 
At most 1 * 0.310842 5.956560 3.841466 0.0147 
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Table 16 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and COMMERCIAL SECTOR  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.389241 16.60672 15.49471 0.0339 
At most 1 0.135555 3.787343 3.841466 0.0516 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None 0.389241 12.81938 14.26460 0.0835 
At most 1 0.135555 3.787343 3.841466 0.0516 
 
Table 17 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.459928 17.18456 15.49471 0.0276 
At most 1 * 0.250536 5.479548 3.841466 0.0192 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None 0.459928 11.70501 14.26460 0.1222 
At most 1 * 0.250536 5.479548 3.841466 0.0192 
 
Table 18 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.481892 15.79886 15.49471 0.0450 
At most 1 0.000714 0.017132 3.841466 0.8957 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.481892 15.78173 14.26460 0.0286 
At most 1 0.000714 0.017132 3.841466 0.8957 
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Table 19 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and OTHER MEDIUM AND LONG 
TERM LOANS 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.676845 23.47922 18.39771 0.0089 
At most 1 * 0.421586 7.664511 3.841466 0.0056 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None 0.676845 15.81471 17.14769 0.0773 
At most 1 * 0.421586 7.664511 3.841466 0.0056 
 
Table 20 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH and M2 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.633852 18.63043 15.49471 0.0163 
At most 1 * 0.278214 4.564367 3.841466 0.0326 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None 0.633852 14.06606 14.26460 0.0537 
At most 1 * 0.278214 4.564367 3.841466 0.0326 
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Table 21 Johansen cointegration test for GDP GROWTH, INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 
COMMERCIAL SECTOR and TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENT LOANS 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.883444 73.02026 47.85613 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.708977 34.33141 29.79707 0.0140 
At most 2 0.388684 12.11306 15.49471 0.1516 
At most 3 0.165403 3.254516 3.841466 0.0712 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.883444 38.68885 27.58434 0.0013 
At most 1 * 0.708977 22.21834 21.13162 0.0351 
At most 2 0.388684 8.858549 14.26460 0.2981 
At most 3 0.165403 3.254516 3.841466 0.0712 
 
Table 22 Johansen cointegration test for GDP and FDI 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.661188 30.21424 15.49471 0.0002 
At most 1 * 0.299852 7.485728 3.841466 0.0062 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.661188 22.72851 14.26460 0.0018 
At most 1 * 0.299852 7.485728 3.841466 0.0062 
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Table 23 Johansen cointegration test for GDP and EDUCATION 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None * 0.325575 18.73649 12.32090 0.0037 
At most 1 * 0.278728 8.495229 4.129906 0.0042 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None 0.325575 10.24126 11.22480 0.0741 
At most 1 * 0.278728 8.495229 4.129906 0.0042 
 
 The Jahansen cointegration tests indicate that there are two co-integrating vectors in 
the set. Next, it is necessary to determine the number of lags for testing causality by 
applying the sequential modified likelihood ratio (LR) test. For the series concerning credit 
extended by different banks the LR test statistic at lag 2 shows the ability to reject null 
hypothesis. For the series regarding loans to different sectors the null hypothesis is rejected 
at lag 3. The lower maximum lag length of the first equation results also from the fact, that 
there are less observations available for it. Considering that for the whole period of 1978-
2005 the data are not complete it is unreasonable to apply many more lags. 
The causality analysis is performed using the equations (6) and (7). Table 24 reports 
the results for causality tests between economic growth and activity of different types of 
banks. Table 25 shows the results for the causality tests between economic growth and use 
of different types of loans. 
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Table 24 Results of the causality tests for different types of banks 
Null hypothesis Chi-sq Probability Causality 
POLICY BANKS does not Granger Cause 
GDP GROWTH 
 
21.82580  0.0000 
POLICY BANKS<->GDP GROWTH 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause 
POLICY BANKS 
 
17.99812  0.0001 
STATE BANKS does not Granger Cause 
GDP GROWTH 
 
1.567582  0.4567 
GDP GROWTH->STATE BANKS 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause 
STATE BANKS 
 
33.36153  0.0000 
OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS  does not 
Granger Cause GDP GROWTH 
 
5.042033  0.0804 GDP GROWTH ->OTHER 
COMMERCIAL BANKS GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause 
OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
14.66321  0.0007 
RURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES does not 
Granger Cause GDP GROWTH 
 
7.166228  0.0278 
RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES<->GDP 
GROWTH 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause 
RURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES 
 
111.1511  0.0000 
M2 does not Granger Cause GDP 
GROWTH 
 
1.031420  0.5971 
No causality 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause 
M2 
 
0.121339  0.9411 
EDUCATION does not Granger Cause 
GDP GROWTH 
 
4.667482  0.0969 
No causality 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause 
EDUCATION 
 
1.528922  0.4656 
FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 
GROWTH 
 
4.726531  0.0941 
GDP GROWTH->FDI 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause 
FDI 
 
104.7912  0.0000 
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Table 25 Results of the causality tests for different types of loans 
Null hypothesis Chi-sq Probability Causality 
M2 does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  0.195293  0.6585 
No causality 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause M2  2.497452  0.1140 
EDU does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  21.80758  0.0001 EDUCATION  
->GDP GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause EDUCATION  0.157707  0.9841 
FDI does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  16.55505  0.0009 FDI <->GDP 
GROWTH GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause FDI  63.10339  0.0000 
AGRICULT. SECTOR  does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  3.971986  0.2645 
No causality 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause AGRICULT. SECTOR  2.547963  0.4667 
CAPITAL CONSTR. does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  5.498146  0.0640 
No causality 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause CAPITAL CONSTR.  0.587103  0.7456 
COMMERCIAL SECTOR does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  2.296265  0.5132 GDP GROWTH 
->COMMERCIAL 
SECTOR GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause COMMERCIAL SECTOR  9.357877  0.0249 
CONSTRUCT. SECTOR does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  6.534698  0.0381 CONSTRUCTION 
SECTOR ->GDP 
GROWTH GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause CONSTRUCT. SECTOR  3.378888  0.1846 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR does not Granger Cause GDP GROWTH  3.601543  0.1652 
No causality 
GDP GROWTH does not Granger Cause INDUSTRIAL SECTOR  1.309289  0.5196 
OTHER MED. AND LONG does not Granger Cause GDP  1.585331  0.4526 
No causality 
GDP does not Granger Cause OTHER MED. AND LONG  0.580049  0.7482 
TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENT does not Granger Cause GDP  0.557203  0.7568 
No causality 
GDP does not Granger Cause TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENT  0.027431  0.9864 
 
The null hypothesis that credit from policy banks does not Granger cause economic 
growth was rejected, which implies that policy banks induce economic growth in the long 
run. And economic growth Granger causes credit from policy banks, thus there is two-way 
causality between the two variables. The null hypothesis that state-owned commercial 
banks do not Granger cause economic growth was accepted, however the inverse null was 
rejected, implying that the causality goes from economic growth to state-owned banks. 
Similarly credit extended by other commercial banks is influenced by economic growth. 
There turned out to be two-way causality between economic growth and rural credit 
cooperatives. 
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Furthermore the results of causality tests provide little evidence that different types 
of loans affect growth. Granger test detected that only loans to construction sector Granger 
cause growth. A one-way causality was also determined between growth and loans to 
commercial sector. There is no causality for other types of loans.   
The results imply that growth and money supply are not connected by the causality. 
As other indicators of financial development showed some causality, this may indicate that 
M2 is not the best proxy for financial development. Although it is not as narrow as M1, it still 
can be more of a sign of financial deepening, which is not necessary connected with 
economic development. For further study it might be better to use M3 or develop a different 
measure of financial development. 
Generally either there is two-way causality or one way-causality from economic 
growth to financial development. Policy banks and economic growth mutually affect each 
other. Policy banks are institutions, in which government has ultimate control, which might 
suggest that funds are not allocated efficiently. Their profitability is also low and they have 
high ratio of non-performing loans. The fact that they manage to positively influence China’s 
development might indicate that state policies concerning financial sector and economic 
growth are successful. And the projects that are financed through policy banks are actually 
helping to generate growth in the long run. These are primarily focused on strategic sectors 
and follow national development schemes. Large infrastructure projects are the flagship 
investments of the government. This can be mirrored by the fact that loans to construction 
sector induce economic growth. 
There is also a two-way causality between economic growth and rural credit 
cooperatives. These institutions have always been closely linked to the state. Their 
management skills are considered low, one indication being high numbers of non-
performing loans. What might explain the fact that they have positive influence on growth, is 
the aim of the loans. Rural credit cooperatives extended their loans largely to township and 
village enterprises, which developed vibrantly when China introduced economic reforms. 
TVEs are said to have played significant role in China’s economic development (Goodhart, Xu, 
2006). They were found to be more efficient than state-owned enterprises as well as 
competitive in international markets (Fu, Balasubramanyam 2003). Rural credit cooperatives 
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finance small and medium sized enterprises in rural areas and through this channel they 
might have contributed to economic growth. 
State-owned commercial banks only follow economic growth and financial 
development  comes about as a result of increased demand for financial services.  They do 
not induce growth. This might result from the burden of financing state-owned enterprises. 
SOEs are proved to be inefficient and large proportion of them are losing money (Perotti, 
Liaxiang, Liang, 1999). The share of SOEs in China’s total industrial output has decreased 
from nearly 78% in 1980 to less than 29% in 1996 (Perotti, Liaxiang, Liang, 1999). It is the 
growing private sector that induces growth in China. And the big four is reluctant to give 
loans to small and private firms. The causality goes from economic growth to the state-
owned banks, which may imply that the prospering economy is encouraging them to extend 
more credit. The same direction of causality is shown with loans to commercial sector. These 
two results can be connected as the big banks have dominant position on the market and 
are responsible for most of the loans to commercial sector. 
Other commercial banks follow economic growth as well, which is surprising given 
the fact that they are the most profitable and best managed banks in China. State influence 
might have been strong enough to force them to support SOEs resulting in not pro-growth 
activity. Another possibility is that commercial banks prefer to give loans to companies, 
which they know, which are big or have state-protection instead of giving them to small 
enterprises of unknown financial situation. Thus, it’s largely SOEs that receive loans, and, as 
mentioned before, this type of companies do not drive economic development in China.      
The analysis shows that that to some extent state policies concerning banking sector 
and economic growth might be successful. The results suggest that state-directed lending 
channelled through policy banks has brought positive effects on China’s economic 
development. It might be the case that because of loans (even the bad ones) positive 
externalities in other sectors emerge. Directed credit can be treated as institutional 
investment which relies on creating jobs, adopting technology or assimilating supportive 
policies and affects total factor productivity, which in turn creates growth (Maswana 2006). 
Direct loans are also used to reduce regional disparities when less developed provinces are 
provided with referential credit treatment. For example China Development Bank allocates 
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around 40% of its loans to projects in Western and Central regions and almost 10% to North-
East parts of China (CDB, 2009). Thus Maswana’s (2008) hypothesis of adaptive efficiency of 
Chinese financial institutions can be partially supported. Although commercial banks might 
not induce growth, but policy banks and rural credit cooperatives actively support the 
development of the economy. Chinese financial system may not have the allocative 
efficiency, however it offers a stable framework for economic activity. 
7. Conclusion 
 This study examined the long-run relationship between economic growth and 
financial development in China for the period 1978-2005. The focus was put on effects of 
different kinds of banks as well as different types of loans. The Johansen test for 
cointegration rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relations, which implies that 
there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between economic growth and financial 
development. I use Granger causality test in VAR framework in order to determine causality 
between the variables. 
The procedure provides evidence that presence and direction of causality is affected 
by the type of bank as well as type of loan. There is bidirectional Granger-causality between 
economic growth and credit extended by policy banks. Similar causality exists between 
economic growth and operations of rural credit cooperatives. Also state-owned commercial 
banks and other commercial banks are economically related to economic growth. However, 
there is only a unidirectional causality from economic growth to financial development in 
their case. The effects of activity of distinct banks is partially mirrored in the results of 
Granger-causality for different types of loans. Loans to construction sector, which can be 
linked to policy banks’ projects, are proved to Granger-cause economic growth. And there 
exists unidirectional causality from economic growth to loans to commercial sector, which 
are a large part of operations in commercial banks. 
The study suggests the need to continue reforms in the financial sector. Since the 
introduction of market reforms Chinese banking institutions have significantly improved 
their management and profitability. The role of sound financial system has been recognised 
and state policies concerning banking sector have proven to be successful in supporting 
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economic growth. However, to sustain the growth it is important to further remove market 
imperfections, develop better credit allocation and improve access to financing for private as 
well as small and medium-sized enterprises.    
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